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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED UTAH LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO 
CATEGORIZE SEPARATE PROPERTY FROM MARITAL PROPERTY 
BEFORE DISTRIBUTING THE ESTATE, 
The trial court misapplied Utah case law, and this misapplication has resulted in a 
substantial and prejudicial award in favor of Wife. Specifically, the trial court failed to 
categorize the parties' property as separate or marital before it distributed the property. 
The court's misapplication of the law represents an abuse of discretion. "The trial court 
is allowed considerable discretion in the division of marital property, so long as it 
exercises this discretion in accordance with the standards set by this state's appellate 
courts." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
prescribed a "systematic approach" for the trial court's disposition of property. Id. at 
1172. Trial courts must first "properly categorize the parties' property as part of the 
marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other [party]." Id; see also Elman 
v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176, 180 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1323. This approach 
must be followed before the court reaches the presumption that each party is entitled to all 
of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property. See Burt, 799 
P.2d. at 1172. Likewise, this approach must be followed before the court considers 
whether exceptional circumstances exist that might affect an equitable division of 
property. See id. 
In this matter, the trial court did not follow this two-step process because it failed 
to first determine what property remained separate and what property had become 
commingled. Although the trial court entered a finding that "each of the parties brought 
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pre-marital assets into the marriage," (R. 460), it failed to make specific and complete 
findings as to what these assets were. In particular, the trial court failed to account for the 
fact that most of these pre-marital assets were commingled, and it failed to identify, 
categorize, and value the parties' separate property that retained its separate character 
throughout the marriage. Instead, the court grouped all of the property together and 
distributed it according to the percentage that each party had brought into the marriage, 
regardless of whether it had become marital property or had retained its separate 
character. (R. 457-462). 
The trial court abused its discretion by instead employing a ratio methodology 
totally unsupported in Utah case law. The trial court determined, based on the value of 
Wife's pre-marital home and her trust account, that Wife brought 2.3 times more property 
into the marriage than Husband. (R. 458). The trial court then applied this ratio to divide 
the entire estate at the time of the divorce, without first categorizing and setting aside the 
respective pre-marital and/or separate property of the parties, an outcome that resulted in 
Wife leaving the marriage with the same proportion of property she had brought to the 
marriage. Although the trial court found that the parties' marriage was not of such a short 
duration that the parties should be restored to their pre-marital position, (R. 457), it 
restored Wife with the same proportion of property she possessed before the marriage so 
that she was not damaged by Husband's alleged principle responsibility for the 
investment losses. (R. 457). See Utah Code Ann. section 30-3-5(8)(c). 
The trial court highlighted the fact that the marital property that was lost originated 
from Wife's premarital trust, even though it also acknowledged that it had become marital 
property. (R. 458). By focusing on the fact that the marital property that was ultimately 
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lost was formerly Wife's, instead of categorizing it as the marital property it had become, 
the court departed from taking the systematic approach set forth in case law. See Burt, 
799 P.2d at 1172. The significance to the trial court of each party's pre-marital 
property should not have been to ensure that the parties were restored to their pre-
marriage economic situations. Instead, the significance should have been to determine 
what had become marital property and what had retained its separate character. 
In short, the trial court exceeded its admittedly broad discretion to fashion a fair 
and equitable property distribution when it misapplied Utah law and disregarded the 
systematic two-step approach set forth in Burt, resulting in substantial prejudice to 
Husband. See Burt, 799 P.2d at 1171-72. The trial court should have categorized 
Husband's separate property in the amount of $166,215, and Wife's separate property in 
the amount of $111,148, before valuing and distributing the marital estate. See 
Addendum B. The marital estate would then have been reduced by a total of $277,363, 
leaving a balance of $1,149,997.60 to be equally divided by the parties. Husband would 
have been awarded his premarital/separate property, plus his one-half portion of the 
marital estate, for a total award of $741,213.80. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISTRIBUTING 
THE MARITAL ESTATE IN WIFE'S FAVOR BASED SOLELY ON 
HUSBAND'S ALLEGED RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVESTMENT LOSSES. 
The trial court exceeded its discretion when it relied solely on the fact that 
Husband was allegedly principally responsible for investment losses in its unequal 
distribution of the parties' marital property in Wife's favor. The trial court's property 
distribution will be upheld "unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is 
demonstrated." Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has long held that "[e]ach party is presumed to be 
entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See also Dunn v. Dunn, 802 
P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Bradford, 993 P.2d at 893 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
A trial court may elect to depart from this presumption and divide separate property only 
in "extraordinary situations where equity so demands," Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169, and to 
distribute marital property unequally only "when the circumstances and needs of the 
parties dictate departure," Bradford, 993 P.2d at 894. Such a departure was not warranted 
or mandated here. 
The court of appeals has identified several instances of extraordinary 
circumstances that justify a departure from the presumed award of separate property and 
an equal split of marital property; however, none are found in this case. See e.g. Davis v. 
Davis, 76 P.3d 716, 720 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (finding that husband's ability to ensure 
adequate retirement funds, wife's inability to do so, and wife's more significant marital 
contributions, amounted to an exceptional circumstance that justified an unequal division 
of the retirement accounts in the wife's favor); Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2006) (finding an exceptional circumstance where family had relocated for 
husband's career, where wife liquidated her premarital assets to further husband's career, 
and where husband's, but not wife's, income had substantially increased); Elman v. 
Elman, 45 P.3d 176, 181 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (awarding wife the husband's separate 
property where she assumed responsibilities that allowed him to appreciate his property). 
As the above instances demonstrate, the most important consideration for the trial 
court when identifying an extraordinary circumstance that justifies a departure from the 
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presumption is "the ultimate division be equitable-that property be fairly divided between 
the parties given their contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the 
time of the divorce." Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172. In other words, equity is ensured with a 
distribution that "best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their 
separate lives." Bradford, 993 P.2d at 894. 
In this matter, the contributions of Wife during the marriage did not justify an 
unequal distribution in her favor; the trial court noted that Husband had supported the 
family during most of the marriage and that the duration of the marriage was not so short 
that this should be discounted. (R. 457; 461). Moreover, the needs or circumstances of 
Wife at the time of divorce did not justify an unequal distribution in her favor because, as 
the trial court recognized, she was able to support herself and pursue a separate life. (R. 
444). 
Instead of relying on the contributions of the parties and on their needs at the time 
of divorce, the trial court allowed Husband's alleged responsibility in losing marital assets 
to dictate its distribution. In Dunn, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's unequal 
distribution of marital property because the trial court had failed to find an exceptional 
circumstance and instead relied solely on one factor: that the husband had been more 
economically productive. See Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1322. The court in this matter similarly 
abused its discretion by relying solely on one economic factor: that Husband was 
principally responsible for investment losses. 
Wife's separate property, consisting of the sale of a premarital house, became 
commingled, and thus marital property,1 when she decided to put it into the joint 
'When a party's separate property has become commingled, it will be considered 
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Ameritrade investment account with the intention that she and Husband would ultimately 
see a return from it. At the point it became marital property, it necessarily ceased to exist 
as Wife's separate property. Although it was Husband who made the day-to-day 
investment decisions that resulted in significant loss, it was Wife and Husband's joint 
decision to make the investments. Because it was marital property, the investment losses 
were marital losses, as the trial court indicated in its findings. (R. 452-53). Just as any 
gains on the account would have been considered in equally distributing the marital 
property, any losses should also be equally distributed. The trial court concluded exactly 
this in its findings: "a gain would be attributable to Petitioner and so was the loss." (R. 
452). 
And just as the trial court should not distribute marital property based "solely on 
the parties' economic contributions to the marriage," Id. at 1323, it also should not 
distribute marital property based solely on the parties' economic losses. And yet, this is 
the only factor the court considered in its unequal distribution. The trial court thus abused 
its discretion when it relied solely on Husband's alleged responsibility in losing the 
investment funds. Husband was prejudiced as a result, which is demonstrated in the trial 
court's overall property distribution. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
ENTER SPECIFIC AND DETAILED FINDINGS SUPPORTING ITS 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION. 
The court did not sufficiently detail any findings that Husband's alleged 
responsibility for losing part of the marital estate in the stock market provided an 
exceptional circumstance that justified an unequal distribution of property. "An unequal 
marital property. See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1990). 
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division of marital property . . . is only justified when the trial court memorializes in 
commendably detailed findings the exceptional circumstances supporting the 
distribution." Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716, 720 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added). 
First, it is not clear from the findings that the trial court considered Husband's alleged 
responsibility to be an exceptional circumstance that justified unequal distribution. 
Second, the trial court failed to explain how Husband's alleged responsibility for the loss 
of marital property justified a distribution of property regardless of whether it was 
separate or marital. 
Not only did the court fail to refer to an "exceptional circumstance," the trial 
court also failed to sufficiently demonstrate that it considered the investment losses an 
exceptional circumstance warranting an unequal distribution of property. The trial court, 
in its findings, noted numerous times that although it considered Husband principally 
responsible for the investment losses, Wife was fully aware of Husband's activities. (R. 
450; 451; 452). Specifically, the trial court concluded that the assets, although it had been 
Wife's premarital property, had become commingled and marital property when she 
"unwisely allowed [Husband] to use it to trade in the stock market," (R. 453); that the 
decision to invest the assets was a joint decision, just as the decision to invest Husband's 
premarital property into the marital home was a joint decision, (R. 452); that she had to 
have known what Husband was doing, (R. 450); and that she sat by while it happened, (R. 
452). Although the court intended for Husband to bear the brunt of the losses, it also 
noted that "the decision to 'lose' the money was not a decision anyone made, but the 
decision to invest, was in reality the decision of both parties." (R. 452). Finally, the trial 
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court determined that the loss carryover from the investments should be equally awarded 
to each party, suggesting that the marital loss should be distributed equally. (R. 456). 
Therefore, from the trial court's own language in its findings, it is not clear that it 
intended Husband's alleged responsibility, considering Wife's knowledge of the 
investment of marital assets and her failure to intervene, to be an exceptional 
circumstance that would justify an unequal distribution of property. 
In addition, the court was so intent on its ratio methodology that it disregarded the 
fact that certain property of Wife and Husband maintained its separate character 
throughout the marriage, while other property became commingled during marriage. The 
court failed to detail in its findings why it did not first categorize the property, why it 
instead lumped all of the property together as marital, and why it failed to award the 
parties their separate property. It was an abuse of the court's discretion to become so 
preoccupied with its perceived equity of restoring Wife to her pre-marriage condition that 
it failed to memorialize in its findings why it failed to categorize the property and account 
for the parties' separate property. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. The trial court made 
several accounting errors both in its valuation of what each party brought into the 
marriage and with regard to what each party received when they divorced. Certain 
valuation errors may be corrected if this Court follows the presumptive rule for dividing 
the marital estate on a fifty-fifty basis, but if this Court does not, the ratio approach used 
by the trial court is still riddled with clear error. These points are more fully discussed in 
the Brief of the Appellant, and are summarized below. First, the trial court made 
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numerous valuation errors in its determination of the value of both Wife's and Husband's 
pre-marital contributions. Even if this Court adopts the trial court's ratio approach, using 
the correct value of the pre-marital assets, Wife brought only 1.3 times, rather than 2.3 
times the value into the marriage. Second, at the time of divorce, the trial court erred in 
its valuation of the marital residence. In addition, at the time of divorce, the trial court 
erred by miscalculating the values of property it ascribed to Wife and Husband. By its 
own theory of ensuring that Wife left the marriage with the same proportion of property 
with which she entered it, the trial court awarded Wife over $300,000 more than it should 
have and Husband over $100,000 less that it should have. The result of the trial court's 
errors is a substantial inequity in the property distribution in favor of Wife. 
V. WIFE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Even if Wife prevails on the main issues in this appeal, because the trial court 
declined to award attorney fees for either party at the trial level, Wife is not entitled to 
attorney fees on appeal. See Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, 350 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) 
(u[W]hen the trial court does not award fees to either party below, then regardless of 
which party prevails on appeal, absent a showing of changed circumstances following the 
trial court's decision warranting such award on appeal, both parties must bear their own 
fees on appeal."). The intent of the Court is not to award attorney fees on appeal to the 
party who was awarded attorney fees on a post-trial motion, but rather to the party who 
was awarded attorney fees at the trial. In this matter, the trial court specifically declined 
to award attorney fees for the trial because it found that both parties were capable of 
paying his and her own. (R. 463). The trial court's subsequent denial of Husband's 
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Motion to Amend Memorandum Decision and award to Wife of attorney fees were solely 
directed toward Wife's fees in responding to Husband's Motion. (R. 471-72). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce in favor of Husband because the trial court failed to divide 
the marital estate as required under Utah Law. It failed to enter specific and detailed 
findings to justify its property distribution, and it made several critical factual errors when 
it determined the parties' pre-marital and separate assets as well as the value of the 
marital estate at the time of divorce.. 
Dated this j £ _ day of July, 2007. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
LEE A. KILLIAN 
Attorneys for Appellant/Respondent 
Michael Hodge 
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